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Two Boats in the Mediterranean and their 
Unfortunate Encounters with Europe’s Policies 
towards People on the Move  
Leonhard den Hertog
* 
CEPS Paper in Liberty and Security in Europe No. 48/July 2012 
Introduction 
Two stark reminders of the difficulties that people on the move encounter in the Mediterranean 
have been grabbing headlines recently: the so-called ‘left-to-die’ boat report and the ground-
breaking  Hirsi  judgment.  These  two  instances  present  the  worst  of  both  worlds:  the  first 
concerns a  migrant boat that was ignored altogether, resulting  in  many  deaths, whereas the 
second concerns a migrant boat being intercepted but subsequently dealt with in a way that 
contradicts Europe’s human rights standards. These two cases are neither isolated nor incidental. 
Instead they are of wider concern to the EU and reminders of structural deficiencies in Europe’s 
approach to people on the move in the Mediterranean. This paper identifies those cross-cutting 
deficiencies and proposes recommendations to correct them. 
1.  The case of the ‘left-to-die’ boat 
The ‘left-to-die’ boat report of the Council of Europe’s (CoE) Parliamentary Assembly (PACE) 
describes the tragic chain of events that led to the death of 63 people at sea.
1 The case, first 
featured  by  British  daily  The  Guardian,
2  was  carefully  investigated  by  PACE  Rapporteur 
Tineke Strik. She concludes that due to a “catalogue of failures” by Search and Rescue (SAR) 
teams and by private and military (NATO) authorities, a small rubber ‘zodiac’ boat (a so-called 
‘dinghy’) was left afloat for 15 days without water, food or rescue. The persons on board the 
dinghy were all sub-Saharan Africans
3 fleeing Libya on 26 March 2011. Their situation in Libya 
had become increasingly precarious as a result of the intensifying conflict: sub-Saharan Africans 
were specifically at risk due to a general suspicion of their involvement in Gadhafi’s mercenary 
forces.
4  
A disconcerting story line emerges from the PACE report. After travelling 18 hours without 
coming  into  sight  of  their  intended  destination,  the  Italian  island  of  Lampedusa,  and  under 
quickly deteriorating weather conditions, their emergency situation was communicated to the 
Italian Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre (MRCC) in Rome. NATO Headquarters (then 
                                                   
*  Marie  Curie  PhD  Fellow,  Universities  of  Cologne  &  Edinburgh.  EXACT  Project  on  EU  External 
Relations. The author would like to express his gratitude to Prof. Elspeth Guild and Dr. Sergio Carrera for 
substantive comments and suggestions on an earlier version of this paper. 
1 T. Strik, “Lives lost in the Mediterranean Sea: Who is responsible?”, Report for the Parliamentary 
Assembly, Committee on Migration, Refugees and Displaced Persons, Council of Europe, 29 March 
2012. 
2  J.  Shenker,  “Aircraft  carrier  left  us  to  die,  say  migrants”,  Guardian.co.uk,  8  May  2011 
(http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/may/08/nato-ship-libyan-migrants). 
3 There were about 70 adults of Ethiopian (47), Nigerian (7), Eritrean (7), Ghanaian (6) and Sudanese (5) 
origin. They included about 20 women, some of whom were pregnant and 2 were babies. See p. 7 of the 
PACE report 2012, op. cit.  
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enforcing  the  no-fly  zone  over  the  area  under  operation  ‘Unified  Protector’),  the  Maltese 
MRCC, Frontex (Warsaw-based EU External Borders Agency) as well as all other vessels in the 
area were then informed of the precarious situation of the dinghy. Moreover, a French aircraft 
took pictures of the assumed boat and transmitted them to the Italian MRCC. According to the 
survivors, shortly thereafter a military helicopter showed up, left again and later returned with a 
small stock of water and biscuits. Rescue seemed imminent, but finally no one returned to offer 
help. Weather conditions further deteriorated and the boat began taking in water and ran out of 
fuel. Several individuals drowned. At some point, the dinghy encountered two private fishing 
boats, but they did not render assistance. After about ten days, and with only half of the crew 
surviving,  a  large  military  vessel  came  in  sight  and  approached  the  dinghy.  Despite  clear 
indications of distress by the remaining individuals on board, such as holding up dead babies 
and  empty  fuel  tanks,  the  military  personnel  took  pictures  but  did  not  engage  in  a  rescue 
operation. Finally, after some 15 days, the dinghy washed ashore in Libya. All 11 survivors 
were instantly arrested, two of whom died shortly thereafter.
5 
2.  The Hirsi case 
This case
6 started with a similar scenario but ended in a radically different way. A ship with 
Eritrean  and  Somali  nationals  left  the  shores  of  Libya  in  May  2009  for  Italy.  They  were 
intercepted by Italian police and coast guard forces in international waters and returned to Libya 
by Italian military vessels. According to the returnees, they had been led to believe that they 
were being taken to Italy. Once it became apparent that they would be disembarking in Libya, 
some individuals objected and requested to be taken to Italy, but to no avail: the individuals 
were handed over to Libyan authorities and their personal effects were confiscated. All this 
happened  on the basis of an Italian-Libyan agreement that allowed for such  extra-territorial 
‘push-backs’.
7 This new Italian strategy was also publicly announced and hailed by the Minister 
of the Interior. At a later stage, several of the individuals managed to obtain refugee status from 
the  United  Nations  High  Commissioner  for  Refugees  (UNHCR)  in  Tripoli  and  one  even 
obtained refugee status in Italy after making a second attempt. It is thus undisputed that the 
refugees  were  in  need  of  international  protection.  Two  of  the  returnees  died  in  unknown 
circumstances after the events.
8  
Some of the returned individuals, with European legal representation, managed to bring a case 
before the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). They argued that their forced return 
exposed them to the risk of inhuman and degrading treatment, in violation of Article 3 (non-
refoulement) of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR; Convention) in Libya as 
well as in their countries of origin (i.e. Somalia and Eritrea) by possible chain refoulement (cf. 
Article 19(2) Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU; Charter). Furthermore they claimed a 
violation  of  Article  4  of  Protocol  4,  which  prohibits  collective  expulsion  (cf.  Article  19(1) 
Charter), and of Article 13 of the Convention, which grants the right to an effective remedy (cf. 
Article 47 Charter). The ECtHR’s Grand Chamber unanimously found a violation of all those 
Articles. It held, inter alia, that the situation in Libya was widely documented as being at odds 
with the Convention rights and hence Italy could not have considered it as a ‘safe country’. The 
                                                   
5 See for a more detailed account of the disastrous journey see the PACE report, op. cit., pp. 6-10. For a 
detailed scientific analysis of the chain of events, including an oceanographic assessment: see also C. 
Heller, L. Pezzani and Situ Studio, “Forensic Oceanography – Report on the ‘Left-To-Die Boat’”, Centre 
for Research Architecture, Goldsmiths, University of London. 
6 ECtHR 23 February 2012, Judgment, Hirsi Jamaa and others v. Italy, Application no. 27765/09. 
7 The concept of ‘push-backs’ entails the practice to divert back to a third country boats with individuals 
on their way to Europe. 
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absence of a remedy to suspend the return operation was furthermore held to be in contravention 
with Article 13 ECHR. What was groundbreaking about the Court’s judgment was that it clearly 
held that these Convention rights can also be  enjoyed  extraterritorially. There  was a strong 
signal in the Court’s argument indicating that these new forms of extraterritorial border control 
necessitate  a  dynamic  interpretation  of  the  Convention,  and  especially  of  the  jurisdiction 
concept (Article 1, ECHR) so as to avoid ‘legal vacuums’. The ruling thus clearly denounced 
the push-back practice.
9 
3.  The  broader  situational  picture:  people  on  the  move  in  the 
Mediterranean  
It is clear that these are neither rare nor isolated instances: rather they are exemplary indications 
of a wider situation of concern for people on the move in the Mediterranean. According to the 
UNHCR, 2011 was the deadliest year so far with an estimated 1,500 individuals reported dead 
or missing.
10 Of course, on many occasions search and rescue is undertaken and lives are saved. 
However, unseaworthy vessels continue to perish, with bodies regularly washing ashore on both 
sides of the Mediterranean. Despite the Mediterranean being a stretch of water dominated by an 
increasingly  dense  network  of  shipping  and  ever-advancing  monitoring,  and  even  more  so 
during the NATO operations in Libya, the number of deaths keeps rising. This is an alarming 
development which cannot be accounted for easily. Hence the conclusion may be warranted that 
deeper factors than the mere ‘coincidental’ lack of proximity or capability of potential rescuing 
vessels contribute to this development. 
The Hirsi case, with 24 applicants, represents only a tip of the iceberg. The practice of push-
backs  appears  to  have  been  much  more  widespread,  also  amongst  EU  member  states  and 
Frontex.
11 Italy carried out at least nine such operations in 2009; in only a four-day time span in 
May 2009 it managed to push back 471 migrants.
12 Furthermore there are reports that Spain 
engaged in return operations off the West-African coast
13 and that Frontex did so during its 
HERA  joint  operations  in  roughly  the  same  area.
14  The  Italian  authorities  suspended  the 
                                                   
9 See for the most relevant parts of the judgment, ibid., pp. 76-82, 122-138, 146-158, 166-186 and 201-
207. 
10 UNHCR, More than 1,500 drown or go missing trying to cross the Mediterranean in 2011, 31 January 
2012, see: http://www.unhcr.org/4f2803949.html. Some estimate the number is much higher; see also the 
numbers featured in Statewatch analysis, quoting ‘Fortress Europe’ which presents numbers of over 1900 
deaths in only the first seven months on 2011: M. Martin, The Arab Spring and the death toll in the 
Mediterranean; the true face of Fortress Europe, Statewatch Analysis.  
11  Human  Rights  Watch,  Pushed  Back,  Pushed  Around,  New  York,  21  September  2009,  pp.  38-40; 
(http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2009/09/21/pushed-back-pushed-around-0);  UNHCR,  “UNHCR 
interviews asylum seekers pushed back to Libya”, Briefing Note, UNHCR, Geneva, 14 July 2009. 
12 Hirsi 2012, op. cit., pt. 13. 
13 P. Ceriani, C. Fernández Bessa, A. Manavella, V. Picco and L. Rodeiro, “Report on the situation on the 
Euro-Mediterranean borders (from the point of view of the respect of human rights)”, CHALLENGE: The 
Changing Landscape of European Liberty and Security, Work Package 9, University of Barcelona, 2009, 
pp. 45-47. They describe the ‘Marine I’ case. 
14  BBC  News,  “Stemming  the  immigration  wave”,  10  September  2006  (http://news.bbc.co.uk/ 
2/hi/europe/5331896.stm#map). Frontex does not deny these diversions (Frontex, “HERA III Operation”, 
News Release, Frontex, Warsaw, 13 April 2007). It claims these diversions always took place under the 
responsibility of a Mauritanian officer, but in our opinion the role of Frontex was absolutely indispensible 
for such diversions to occur. See Frontex, “HERA 2008 and NAUTILUS 2008 Statistics”, News Release, 
Frontex, Warsaw, 17 February 2009(a); see also J.J. Jeandesboz, “Reinforcing the Surveillance of EU 
Borders: The Future Development of FRONTEX and Eurosur”, CHALLENGE Research Paper No. 11, 
CEPS, Brussels, August 2008, pp. 15-16. 4  LEONHARD DEN HERTOG 
practices and agreements in 2011 due to the events in Libya. However, despite the clear ruling 
of the Strasbourg Court and due to the policy’s relative ‘effectiveness’ in reducing arrivals of 
irregular migrants,
15 future attempts may be expected from Italy and other EU member states in 
the  Mediterranean  to  shift  responsibility  onto  third  states  for  keeping  migrants  ‘at  home’, 
thereby stretching the boundaries of jurisdiction and responsibility. As a matter of fact, there 
have been media reports that Italy is currently in the process of concluding a new agreement 
with Libya in this area, the details of which are still unclear.
16 
4.  Specific causes: Why was this journey made? Why were the refugees 
left-to-die? Why were others pushed ‘pushed back’? 
Why has the situation developed in this direction? After assessing the question of why people 
leave on such dangerous voyages, the specific causes of the two cases are addressed here.  
First, the question of why people undertake such journeys should not be overlooked. Of course, 
any trip with unseaworthy boats that can be prevented could decrease casualties. As we are 
speaking of ‘mixed flows’,
17 the motives are diverse; ranging from seeking labour opportunities 
to international protection. In the case of the ‘left-to-die’ boat, the specific motives originated 
clearly from the revolutions and war in North Africa. More attention should be given to create 
other avenues for these individuals to reach European territory and thereby safety and access to 
an asylum procedure. After all, if no regular means exist to bring oneself into safety, especially 
in a conflict situation, taking recourse to dangerous escape routes becomes the only option. 
Already now, a large portion of asylum-seekers enter the EU in an irregular way.  
It  is  also  important  to  understand  the  larger  context  of  Europe’s  policy  responses  to  the 
migratory flows produced during the ‘Arab Spring’ across the Mediterranean and how they do 
not facilitate ways for individuals to obtain protection. Italy, at that time, was attempting to stem 
the influx of individuals from North Africa, also by seeking cooperation with Tunisia.
18 The 
EU’s immediate response, alongside funding humanitarian aid and repatriations, was to launch a 
Frontex  joint  operation  named  HERMES  focused  on  “detecting  and  preventing  illegitimate 
border crossings”.
19 Among these various EU efforts, the priority seemed strongly in the sphere 
of  border  control  and  reducing  irregular  migration.  Analogously,  its  long-term  response  as 
worded  in  the  Commission  Communication  of  DG  Home  entitled  “Dialogue  on  Migration, 
Mobility and Security” presents a regime of conditionality with the Mobility Partnership as a 
central  instrument  whereby  third  States  would  have  to  take  initiatives  in  this  sphere:  sign 
readmission  agreements,  sign  working  arrangements  with  Frontex,  cooperate  in  joint 
                                                   
15 Italy stated that as a result of the push-back practices, the flow of irregular migrants has decreased 
fivefold; Hirsi 2012, op. cit., p. 4. 
16 “Libya-Italy agree joint action against immigration”, Times of Malta, 4 April 2012. 
17 This refers to groups of people on the move consisting of individuals that may be covered by diverging 
legal regimes, such as legal statuses applicable to refugees versus labour migrants. Cf. R. Zetter, "More 
Labels, Fewer Refugees: Remaking the Refugee Label in an Era of Globalization", Journal of Refugee 
Studies, Vol. 20, No. 2, 2007, pp. 172-192. This concept is developed to account for increasingly complex 
migration and refugee flows, but it may also facilitate discussion that promotes the distinction of ‘bogus’ 
versus ‘genuine’ asylum-seekers, legitimate versus illegitimate migrants and individuals legally versus 
illegally on the move. It should therefore be used with caution. 
18  ANSA,  “Italy  continues  talks  with  Tunis,  no  halt  to  migrant  flood”,  5  April  2011 
(http://www.ansa.it/web/notizie/rubriche/english/2011/04/05/visualizza_new.html_1526735437.html); 
“Italy, Tunisia sign deal to ease migrant crisis”, Reuters (Africa), 5 April 2011. 
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surveillance and capacity-building in border control.
20 It is hence clear that the primary focus 
has not been on SAR or fundamental rights-compliant interception practices. Rather, it is access 
to Europe that is framed as problematic. 
The lack of regular access to Europe is illustrated in the story of one of the survivors. He was 
born in Eritrea and had worked for years in Libya as a mechanic and had no plans to migrate to 
Europe. It  was  only after the battles between pro-Gadhafi forces and rebels broke  out, and 
NATO  started  its  bombing  campaign,  that  his  situation  became  increasingly  precarious.  As 
highlighted above, his sub-Saharan origin made him a suspect and easy target for rebel forces. 
He took a huge risk by being cramped on an overcrowded dinghy, and, even more strikingly, 
even made a second attempt after the failure of the first doomed voyage.
21 If this person would 
have been aware of other ways to escape his predicament, perhaps his cross-Mediterranean boat 
journey could have been prevented. Access to and awareness of initiatives to bring those to 
safety, such as emergency visas issued by embassies or resettlement operations, are thus vital.
22 
Again, this exemplifies a broader picture whereby Europe is cutting ever more access routes to 
its territory, and thereby to its asylum system, through its visa, border and migration policies. 
Only hazardous routes to Europe thereby remain; some are thereby forced to take such risks. So, 
it is a noble cause to prevent these perilous journeys across the Mediterranean but this should be 
accompanied by opening up other options for those in need of safety.   
Second, as far as the ‘left-to-die’ boat case is concerned, the question of how this could happen 
is analysed quite extensively in the CoE PACE report. Apart from the gross and inexcusable 
neglect of the dinghy’s precarious situation by the authorities, the report also identifies some 
factors that may have allowed for this situation to arise: 
a)  The  legal  regime  covering  SAR  is  found  to  be  insufficiently  clear and  binding.  This 
concerns  both  the  definition  of  distress  and  allocation  of  the  responsibility  to  act, 
especially in the rare instance where a coastal state (here Libya) loses the capacity to 
maintain responsibility for its SAR region.  
b)  Several factors decrease the likelihood of private entities engaging in rescue operations. 
Apart  from  the  clear  economic  repercussions  of  engaging  in  rescue,  the  fear  of 
criminalisation also contributes to the reluctance to engage in such operations. Cases in 
Italy where rescuers faced trial add to this fear on the part e.g. of fishermen.
23 Moreover, 
the on-going disagreement between Malta and Italy over the 2004 amendments to the 
SAR Convention and the Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) regarding 
disembarkation create a lack of legal certainty. There have already been several instances 
where long negotiations were needed before a disembarkation point was agreed upon, 
sometimes risking the lives of those waiting to be rescued. This could also add to delays 
on the part of potential rescue vessels.  
c)  The report identifies an apparent lack  of planning  on behalf  of NATO and European 
States to prepare for the foreseeable human migratory flows out of Libya. According to 
the report, no working agreement was established between the NATO Headquarters in 
Naples and SAR authorities and NATO did not seem very pro-active or approachable 
with SAR requests.
24 
                                                   
20  European  Commission,  Communication,  A  dialogue  for  migration,  mobility  and  security  with  the 
Southern Mediterranean countries, COM(2011) 292 final. 
21 See the personal story on video footage (http://www.fidh.org/Death-of-63-migrants-in-the). 
22 Although on an ad hoc basis, France and Germany have reportedly issued some of these visas. 
23 PACE Report 2012, op. cit., pp. 16-17, fn. 20. 
24 Ibid., p. 3. 6  LEONHARD DEN HERTOG 
Thirdly,  the  reasons  for  the  push-back  practices  are  of  a  different  nature.  Here,  rather,  the 
abovementioned  ‘effectiveness’  of  the  practice  in  reducing  irregular  migration  flows  is  of 
paramount importance to understand the attractiveness of this option for politicians and policy-
makers. Moreover, the push for the ‘externalisation’ or ‘extraterritorialisation’ of border checks 
is also  encouraged  in EU  discussions:  in recent  years, starting from the Tampere European 
Council  in  1999,
25  the  priority  given  to  cooperation  with  countries  of  origin  or  transit  has 
featured high on the Brussels policy agenda.
26 Extraterritorial push-back practices, although in 
no way legitimized by this debate, are the ultimate consequence of a line of thinking whereby 
responsibility is shifted to third states. Moreover, the popular belief of an increasing need ‘to do 
something’ and reduce the irregular migration flows adds to the pressure on politicians and 
policy-makers to resort to such far-reaching ‘solutions’. However, this popular belief does not 
come out of nowhere. Some EU and member state authorities, especially those with a ‘home 
affairs’ focus,
27 have aided the process of linking migration and crime (or rather: criminals),
28 
thereby criminalising or ‘insecuritising’ it, imposing an ever-greater imperative to ‘combat’ or 
‘fight’ it.
29 Inter-agency cooperation, such as by Frontex and Europol,
30 reinforces this lack of 
distinction between people on the move and criminals and erodes the position of individuals as 
holders of rights against the background of ‘mixed flows’ and ‘bogus’ migrants.
31   
5.  The cross-cutting failures of lacking accountability and solidarity 
Cross-cutting failures in Europe’s policy in the Mediterranean Sea emerge from these cases and 
their specific causes. They are neither incidental nor isolated; in fact they are systemic to the 
way the EU and its member states work when it comes to human mobility, especially in the 
external dimension of migration and asylum.  
First, there is a general lack of accountability for what happens on the Mediterranean Sea. As 
the Court held in the Hirsi case, the push-back practices violated the applicants’ right to an 
effective remedy. Furthermore, so far no one has been held accountable for the lost lives at sea 
in the ‘left-to-die’ boat case. This lack of accountability has two particularly salient features: a 
lack of clarity and a lack of monitoring.  
a)  There is a lack of clarity concerning the responsibility for SAR, disembarkation and the 
processing of asylum applications and concerning the applicability and binding nature of 
legal norms. It becomes clear from the ‘left-to-die’ boat case that the small void left by 
                                                   
25 European Council, Conclusions of the Presidency, Tampere, 15-16 November 1999. 
26 See e.g. the Stockholm Programme – An open and secure Europe serving and protecting citizens, OJ 
2010, C 155/01, p. 28. 
27 For an overview of some of the characteristics of a ‘home affairs’ focus, see S. Carrera, E. Guild, L. 
den Hertog and J. Parkin, “Implementation of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and its impact on 
EU Home Affairs Agencies - Frontex, Europol and the European Asylum Support Office”, EP Study 
(Citizen's rights and constitutional affairs), August 2011, section 6.1.  
28 Illustrative in this respect is Europol’s assessment of migration flows from North Africa as a terrorist 
threat: Europol, “EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report”, TE-SAT 2011, Europol, The Hague, 19 
April  2011  (www.europol.europa.eu/publications/EU_Terrorism_Situation_and 
_Trend_Report_TE-SAT/TE-SAT2011.pdf). 
29 See S. Carrera, “Towards a common European Border Service?”, CEPS Working Document No. 331, 
CEPS, Brussels, 2010, p. 10; D. Bigo, «Police en Réseaux: L’expérience européenne», Paris: Presses de 
Sciences Po, 1996, pp. 258-266. 
30 See Council of the European Union, The Joint Report by EUROPOL, EUROJUST and FRONTEX on 
the State of Internal Security in the EU, 9359/10, Brussels, 7 May 2010. 
31 This and some other arguments in this paper have been argued more extensively in S. Carrera et al. 
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the relevant legal rules was exploited by the actors to shift responsibility (and afterwards 
the blame) amongst  each  other. The  lack  of clarity, although by  no  means  justifying 
refraining  from  action,  also  applies  to  the  selection  of  a  point  of  disembarkation; 
especially  the  persisting  disagreement  between  Malta  and  Italy  over  the  2004 
amendments to the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) and 
the International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue (SAR) is worrisome.
32 This 
produces a lack of clarity and legal certainty, thereby adding an incentive for potential 
rescue vessels to be hesitant about engaging in SAR. Currently, rules concerning search 
and rescue and disembarkation applicable to Frontex operational coordination at sea are 
before the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU).
33 However, these rules in 
themselves do not meaningfully reinforce the SAR legal framework and would thus not 
provide the much-needed full clarity. The unclear and overlapping ways of working of 
relevant actors in the Mediterranean Sea – i.e. Frontex, Member States, NATO, third 
States and international organisations – make it difficult to demarcate responsibility and 
establish  liability,  which  is  crucial  for  meaningful  accountability.  Furthermore,  some 
actors are expanding their activities in an ‘experimentalist’ way, which means that their 
practices and policy tools take them into originally unforeseen domains of intervention.
34 
Inherently, these new activities are often not regulated and lack a clearly defined legal 
basis. This aggravates the above-mentioned demarcation of responsibility. For example, 
Frontex joint operations have formally been ‘coordinated’ by the Agency, without a clear 
definition of what this entails, but in practice this role is of a highly operational nature.
35     
b)  These ways of working remain obscure by the lack of effective monitoring. It is very hard 
to establish what actually happens in the Mediterranean Sea as no proper independent 
oversight of the actions is in place. The apparent unwillingness of certain actors (NATO, 
participating  States)  in  the  ‘left-to-die’  boat  case  to  provide  relevant  evidence  to 
reconstruct the chain of events illustrates the general tendency to work in secrecy. During 
the negotiations of the new Frontex mandate in 2011, the member states insisted that 
independent  observers  would  not be allowed  on board  without their approval.
36  As  a 
result, SAR failures and push-backs could go, and probably continue to go, unnoticed and 
thereby unaccounted for. Certainly, if proper monitoring would have been in place, the 
likelihood of such events would be lower and at least someone could be held accountable. 
Some  of  these  issues  relate  to  the  current  negotiations  on  the  Commission’s  EUROSUR 
(European Border Surveillance System) proposals.
37 Unfortunately, and apart from the question 
of the proportionality of this initiative, these proposals as such cannot be expected to improve 
the situation. At the outset it should be noted that the proposal itself excludes the member states’ 
                                                   
32See A. Díaz Tejera, Parliamentary Assembly, Council of Europe, Report on the interception and rescue 
at sea of asylum seekers, refugees and irregular migrants, Doc. 12628. 
33 Council Decision 2010/252/EU of 26 April 2010 supplementing the Schengen Borders Code. The EP 
challenged these rules before the Court arguing that an invalid legal procedure had been used; case C-
335/10, Parliament v Council. On 17 April 2012, Advocate-General Mengozzi delivered his opinion 
recommending the Court to annul the decision.  
34  For  work  on  ‘experimentalist  governance’  and  Frontex,  see  J.  Pollack  and  P.  Slominski, 
“Experimentalist but not Accountable Governance? The Role of Frontex in Managing the EU’s External 
Borders”, West European Politics, Vol. 32, No. 5, September 2009, p. 905. 
35 See also Carrera et al., 2011, op. cit., p. 13 
36  Regulation  (EU)  No.  1168/2011  of  25  October  2011  amending  Council  Regulation  (EC)  No. 
2007/2004 (Frontex Regulation), Art. 13 (par. 3), 14 (par. 6). 
37  European  Commission,  Communication,  Proposal  for  a  Regulation  of  the  EP  and  of  the  Council 
establishing the European Border Surveillance System (EUROSUR), COM(2011) 873 final. 8  LEONHARD DEN HERTOG 
SAR obligations from the scope of the Regulation.
38 Thus it does not offer more clarity on SAR 
responsibilities. Moreover, the situational awareness that the system is promised to bring about 
cannot be expected to improve the SAR capabilities of the EU and its member states or end 
potential push-back practices; instead this ‘tool’ would only make more visible the enduring 
problems identified in this paper as the issues identified above remain unresolved. Despite its 
rhetoric on saving lives, its dominant focus on border control and reducing irregular migration 
as  well  as  the  deep  involvement  of  ‘Home  Affairs’-minded  Frontex  further  aggravates  the 
challenges to much-needed clarity, scrutiny and accountability.    
Second, the lack of solidarity amongst European states (internal) as well as with third states 
(external) is a clear obstacle to many advances that would alleviate the situation. The lack of 
solidarity  is  evident  from  the  abovementioned  disagreement  over  the  disembarkation  rules. 
Moreover, the southern member states have to mount greater efforts to ensure a fundamental 
rights-compliant response to  migratory flows in the  Mediterranean. The Dublin regime (EU 
rules on the designation of the responsible member state for an asylum application)
39 amplifies 
that imbalance further. The absence of regular access to protection for those seeking refuge is 
another sign of inadequate solidarity. Exemplary in this regard is the fact that only Switzerland 
maintains  its procedure to process asylum requests at its embassies. It is currently debating 
whether  to  abolish  this  instrument  of  international  protection,  partly  because  of  the 
overburdening of Swiss embassy personnel. This is related to the fact that no other European 
state has yet been willing to open a similar procedure, although it is true that some countries do 
so  on  an  ad-hoc  basis.
40  If  this  policy  would  be  shared  amongst  EU  member  states  (plus 
Schengen countries such as Switzerland), the work load could be divided. This would be a sign 
of both internal and external solidarity. The on-going and difficult debate at EU level about 
resettlement is further evidence of a low level of solidarity among the member states. The recent 
agreement on the EU Joint Resettlement Programme is a good step in the right direction, but EU 
countries still lag far behind other industrialised states.
41  
6.  Conclusion and Recommendations 
Hence, a picture emerges of a policy field with unclear, secretive and experimentalist ways of 
working  which  has  fostered  informal  and  non-binding  coordination  networks  of  ‘law 
enforcement’  actors  involved  in  border  control  and  surveillance  where  responsibility  can 
sometimes be evaded.
42 The individual on the move on the Mediterranean Sea is thereby in no 
position to challenge decisions or have rights enforced but is rather dependent on good will. 
Moreover,  it  follows  from  the  ECtHR’s  Hirsi  judgement  that  pre-border  control  and  extra-
territorial push-back operations are inherently problematic for human rights compliance; it is 
precisely the absence  of rights protection that  makes the policy so ‘effective’. It is  hard to 
imagine  an  arrangement  whereby  European  authorities  can  fulfil  the  requirements  of  non-
refoulement and effective remedy in an extraterritorial setting. Continuing this policy would 
seem  unacceptable,  especially  in  a  post-Lisbon  era  with  the  Charter  in  effect  and  expected 
increased accountability. Seen in the context of wider EU external relations, such practices may 
                                                   
38 Ibid., see preamble, recital 16. 
39 See S. Peers, “The revised ‘Dublin’ rules on responsibility for asylum-seekers: The Council’s failure to 
fix a broken system”, Statewatch Analysis. 
40 C. Hein and M. de Donato, Exploring avenues for protected entry in Europe, March 2012, pp. 54-60 
41  See  the  text  adopted  by  the  European  Parliament  on  29  March  2012 
(http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&language=EN&reference=P7-TA-2012-104); 
see also UNHCR, “UNHCR welcomes adoption of Joint EU Resettlement Programme”, 30 March 2012 
(http://www.unhcr.org/4f7589ef9.html(. 
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also jeopardise the legitimacy of the EU’s central objectives, such as the promotion of human 
rights and the rule of law,
43 and hamper the success of its key initiatives, such as the European 
Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). 
Apart  from  recommending  the  end  of  the  continuous  linking  of  migration  with  crime  and 
criminals – a systemic threat to solidarity in this field and the fulfilment of the obligation to 
protect – this final section advances several policy suggestions aimed at improving the situation. 
The CoE report already proposed several recommendations; we shall partly follow those and 
add to them.  
1.  There should be a set of clear rules and effective coordination concerning SAR and 
disembarkation in the Mediterranean. The past has shown that individual member states 
are unable to resolve their differences; Malta’s resistance to the 2004 SOLAS and SAR 
amendments has created continuous uncertainty. The EU should therefore take the lead to 
end this situation via the following measures: 
a.  Introducing  EU  legislation  with  unambiguous  rules  concerning  SAR  and 
disembarkation, hereby explicitly bringing these matters under the EU’s competence. 
The legislation should follow existing international law but allow for introducing more 
binding obligations and sanctions for non-compliance – filling those remaining legal 
lacunae on e.g. the definition of ‘distress’. Non-binding guidelines concerning SAR 
from  the  International  Maritime  Organisation  (IMO)  should  also  be  codified  and 
become binding at EU level. If these would have been followed, the deaths of the 
individuals on the ‘left-to-die’ boat could have been prevented.
44 The proposed rules 
for Frontex sea border operations adding to the Schengen Borders Code (SBC) are a 
step in the right direction, but they need additional clarification (e.g. on informing 
individuals to be disembarked on their asylum rights in the EU) and should become 
binding.
45 
b.  Establishing a pan-Mediterranean MRCC that would oversee the national MRCCs. 
This body (probably in the form of an EU Agency) would ensure the follow-up of 
distress calls and the coordination of SAR operations. It would thereby prevent the 
shifting of responsibility of SAR duties between different actors in the Mediterranean. 
It should have the power to make binding decisions on the basis of the introduced EU 
legislation to allocate responsibility for SAR and disembarkation. It would also have 
the competence to report non-compliance to the relevant law enforcement authorities, 
such  as  the  Commission  and  competent  national  administrative  and  criminal 
authorities.  
c.  The EU and its member states should strive to include non-member states in this 
EU-led Mediterranean SAR framework of clear legal rules and oversight. To that 
end, it should strive to conclude a pan-Mediterranean treaty in which these third States 
would be bound by the identical set of unambiguous norms and the oversight by the 
newly established MRCC. The EU should use its full leverage to this end, especially 
in the framework of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and could use the 
Mobility  Partnerships  as  an  instrument.  This  involvement  of  third  States  should, 
however, fully respect the rights of people on the move and should not negatively 
impact the access of these people to asylum procedures in the EU. 
                                                   
43 See Art. 21 TEU. 
44 See PACE Report 2012, op. cit., p. 14. See for instance the International Aeronautical and Maritime 
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2.  To  obtain  reliable  facts  on  the  situation  in  the  Mediterranean  Sea  and  to  increase 
accountability, effective monitoring should be put in place. As a matter of principle, on 
all  Frontex  Joint  Operations  and  national  operations,  independent  observers  should  be 
allowed. These observers can be recruited from relevant NGOs, international organisations 
(such as the UNHCR) or legal experts. This monitoring could be coordinated by the soon-
to-be-created post of EU Border Monitor, as recommended earlier.
46 It should have two 
main competences: “The first would be to ensure that EU border controls, wherever they 
take place, are consistent with EU law and the Charter of Fundamental Rights. The second 
would be to monitor the conditions under which expulsions take place under the framework 
provided by the Return Directive.”
47 Furthermore, the proposed pan-Mediterranean MRCC 
should have access to relevant data, such as satellite imagery and operational plans. As far 
as EU agencies and national authorities are concerned, there should be a time limit on the 
confidentiality and non-disclosure of documents, reports and arrangements of the agencies. 
They should retroactively disclose documents previously considered to be ‘sensitive’ after a 
certain time period.  
3.  Acknowledging that SAR by governmental assets cannot sufficiently alleviate the situation, 
private entities should be encouraged to engage in such operations and face sanctions if 
they  refrain  from  doing  so.  The  proposed  EU  legislation  and  pan-Mediterranean  treaty 
should therefore introduce meaningful sanctions for non-compliance and should prohibit 
any criminalisation of those offering a helping hand. Moreover, all actors engaging in SAR 
operations  should  be  ensured  that  disembarkation  of  the  rescued  shall  be  swift.  The 
proposed rules and  oversight powers of the pan-Mediterranean MRCC should offer that 
clarity.  Moreover,  an  EU  fund  should  be  established  covering  (partly)  the  incurred 
economic loss for private entities. 
4.  To increase solidarity and ensure regular ways of taking refuge, the EU and its member 
states should increase the relocation and resettlement of migrants, i.e. both within the EU 
as well as from third States. The recently agreed EU Joint Resettlement Programme is a step 
in the right direction, but it needs now to be implemented loyally and pro-actively by all 
member states. 
5.  All  EU  member  states  should  put  in  place  a  regulated  and  permanent  in-Embassy 
humanitarian visa or asylum application procedure, to allow individuals and families to 
escape  situations  of  risk  in  a  regular  way.  A  common  approach  would  avoid  the 
overburdening of European states currently offering or willing to offer this option, such as 
Switzerland.  
6.  Implementing  the  unambiguous  ECtHR  Hirsi  ruling,  push-backs  should  be  explicitly 
prohibited  by  EU  law.  Extraterritorial  maritime  operations  should  always  have  the 
objective of SAR and disembarkation in an EU member state.  
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